



## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #2690-82

1 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : [REDACTED]  
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

SUBJECT : Decision on Warning Working Group Report

25X1

1. Your approval is requested for the implementation of your decisions on warning as outlined in the memorandum. If this concept meets with your approval please sign the attached memorandum to the NFIB to get us started on the process of working out details of organization, procedures, and personnel.

2. We will construct a mechanism to draw upon the product and activities of the separate warning elements within the Intelligence Community. In the interests of economy, we will avoid unnecessary redundancy of warning activities. The most prominent example is the extensive, and expensive, ADP systems used to sort warning-related data in the DIA managed DoD I&W System. We will establish procedures to enable us to use the data and to respond to DoD requests for comment but we will not duplicate that activity.

3. On the other hand, there are warning-related analytical functions in the CIA, DIA, State/INR, and elsewhere that we will duplicate with the objective of ensuring the development of alternative views and avoiding the pitfalls of many recent warning failures. We are negotiating with Harry Cochran to serve as a special consultant for warning analysis.

4. A brief discussion of where we stand with [REDACTED] would be appropriate. [REDACTED] is a rare talent and he is reasonably enthusiastic about applying it to the warning problem. His interest in warning is long-standing and he may have already described that to you. On the other hand, he has been explicit in stating what he does not want to do. He has made it a condition of his reemployment that he not be given any management responsibilities such as those

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET

SUBJECT: Decision on Warning Working Group Report

DDI #2690-82

1 April 1982

incurred by the NIO/Warning or the director of a warning staff. [ ] has discussed with [ ] various ways of fitting [ ] into a warning mechanism and asked if he would consider being NIO, staff director, or whatever. [ ] reply was interesting. "I am retired, management chores are behind me, and I have no intention of getting into a white-knuckle job again. I want to deal only with ideas and substantive intelligence." We are refining with [ ] the details of how to do that in the role of "special assistant, special consultant, etc."

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

5. The "no-surprise" doctrine in DCID 1/5 will be retained with the understanding that the definition will be expanded to include slower developing, longer term intelligence problems of social change and economic issues. There are limits, of course, to this expansion of the warning function and we are particularly sensitive to the danger of being distracted from the survival issues of big-W warning. We also recognize the requirement to warn, in a timely manner, of Iran-type situations of societal and political change. There is a clear need in the CIA to imbue more of the production office analysts with a sense of responsibility for warning. We will work closely with the DDI in this regard.

6. The procedures for integrating the various Community warning activities into a national warning system should be a bit more systematic than what has existed in the past. There appears to be support for a stronger leadership role by the DCI warning mechanism to coordinate policy and resource issues, to take the lead in premonitory analysis of warning issues and to facilitate the rapid and timely dissemination of warning intelligence at the national level. These objectives can be achieved by involving the NIOs and consultants as a collegial body in structured discussions of warning problems in addition to their role of individually leading monthly warning discussions of Community regional analysts. A national warning staff with representation from most of the Community, will be the mechanism for tending the warning machinery in Washington and providing a continuous DCI presence in the warning arena.

7. The structure of the national warning staff need not be decided in detail now. There is a consensus in the Community that the staff should have representation from at least, State, NSA, DIA, and CIA. The service intelligence chiefs have been somewhat ambivalent about committing themselves to filling billets but they probably will come up with a proposal to supply one man from each service or fill one billet in rotation among the three services. We have ten billets occupied today. I recommend that we fill the warning staff billets over the next year to its current authorization of about 15 professional and 5 clerical positions. A reasonable mix of talent and organizational representatives can be worked out by the Warning Working Group.

SECRET

DDI #2690-82  
SUBJECT: Decision on Warning Working Group Report 1 April 1982

8. The directors of the warning staffs have been CIA officers with military deputies in recent years. There have been suggestions to change this to routinely have a military officer, detailed to CIA, serve as warning staff director. All agree that would provide a nice ecumenical touch but even the service intelligence chiefs are skeptical of their ability to turn up a well-qualified nominee. In the interest of getting a good director, soon, I recommend that we proceed to recruit the best qualified person recognizing that it likely will be a CIA officer.

9. The location of the staff is strongly influenced by space available. Space is available here for 2-3 people and in the Pentagon (present Strategic Warning Staff quarters) for about 10 people. There is a prevailing opinion that most of the warning staff should be here, to better serve you and to work with the DDI analytical elements. There also is a strong body of opinion, particularly among the military, that the warning staff should maintain a presence in the Pentagon. Thus, I recommend that we have elements of the staff in both places and adjust strength as we evolve in the next year.

10. The Warning Working Group has been a satisfactory body for providing the Community insight into the DCI warning activities and as a channel for suggesting change. I recommend that we continue it.

11. There is an issue of the DCI role in warning with respect to the political elements of NATO. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, (SACEUR) sponsors exchanges of warning intelligence information and analysis through Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE). Also, he sponsors bilateral exchanges through his J-2 EUCOM with each of the national forces outside the NATO arena. What is lacking is a continuous, coherent effort at the political level to reduce the security barriers to warning exchanges, a continuous tutorial at the ministerial level to educate governments on the warning problem, and a sophisticated dialogue. What we do have in this political arena are occasional DoD briefings and several years of DoD studies pointing out the need for a more coherent effort. I recommend that we not work this problem through the Warning Working Group. I recommend that the Chairman/Vice Chairman NIC work this directly with Bud McFarland, Larry Eagleburger, and Fred Ikle.

12. This memorandum does not contain a full discussion of all the issues raised in the Warning Working Group Report. I do not

SECRET

SUBJECT: Decision on Warning Working Group Report

DDI #2690-82  
1 April 1982

believe that you are required to make a decision on all these issues. Everything I have recommended is consistent with the working group consensus and the remarks at the NFIB. Therefore, I request your approval to proceed along the lines of this memorandum.



25X1

APPROVAL:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)

DISAPPROVED:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Date)

All Portions of this Memorandum  
are Classified SECRET